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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While most facts recited by Warburton are true to 
the record, one "fact" appears to be fashioned from whole 
cloth. Because this supposed "fact" is pivotal to the 
notice issue, it warrants a rebuttal. 
Warburton's Fact #14 (Warburton Brief, p. 6) twice 
identifies a mortgage broker, Richards Woodbury, as "VBF's 
agent." Warburton presents no citation to the record to 
establish that agency relation. The record is devoid of 
such a fact or finding. Richards Woodbury brokered the loan 
between the developer and a coalition of lenders. Nowhere 
in the Partial Summary Judgment or ultimate Findings of Fact 
is there a finding that Richards Woodbury acted as an agent 
for one party or the other. Indeed, Finding of Fact #5 
entered by the trial court identifies Richards Woodbury as a 
"mortgage broker," and not as an agent of either party. (R. 
3405.) 
The assertion as "fact" that Richards Woodbury was 
VBF's agent should be disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
VBF submits the following points in reply to 
Warburton's brief. As required by Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this reply brief is limited to 
answering new matters set forth in Warburton's brief. 
1 
I. THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS BASED 
ON THE SAMPLE LRA, NOT WARBURTON'S LRA. 
Warburton attempts to distance himself from the 
sample LRA, arguing that his own LRA has "significant and 
determinative" differences from the sample LRA (Warburton 
Brief p. 10). Any such differences are unavailing to 
Warburton, as the August 22, 1991 Partial Summary Judgment 
clearly turned on the sample LRA. Individual LRA's were not 
before the Court: 
The Court's ruling in August of 1991 
granting partial summary judgment was 
based on a sample LRA submitted to the 
Court with the argument that the 
language in the sample LRA constituted 
an easement. The Court reviewed that 
language, agreed that it did establish 
an easement and so ruled. The Court did 
not at that time apply its ruling to any 
specific plaintiffs. 
June 5, 1992 Order of District Court, p. 2 (Exhibit "A" 
hereto). 
Those plaintiffs who could produce a signed LRA later moved 
to have the Summary Judgment applied specifically to them. 
Their motion was initially denied due to affirmative 
defenses raised by VBF: 
The Court is of the opinion that there 
are three (3) issues of fact which are 
common to all of the plaintiffs and 
which therefore require a trial and the 
presentation of evidence to the trier of 
fact before the Court can apply it's 
ruling granting partial summary judgment 
to any specific plaintiffs. Those 
questions of fact are whether 
2 
consideration has been paid by the 
plaintiffs, whether any of the 
agreements have been resold by any of 
the plaintiffs and whether any of the 
plaintiffs have received any refunds for 
their LRA's. 
June 5, 1992 Order, p. 2 (Exhibit "A"). 
Based on the Court's identification of these fact 
issues, some plaintiffs renewed their motion for specific 
application of the 1991 Partial Summary Judgment by 
furnishing individual proof of consideration, no re-sale, 
and no refund. Faced with that proof, VBF stipulated that 
certain plaintiffs (including Warburton) "qualified" for the 
Partial Summary Judgment. (January 15, 1993 Minute Entry, 
Exhibit 3 to Warburton Brief). Contrary to Warburton's 
assertion, the record shows that the application of the 
Partial Summary Judgment to specific plaintiffs did not turn 
on the language of individual LRA's. 
It would have been illogical for the District 
Court to consider individual LRA's at the summary judgment 
level, because it was disputed whether VBF had any 
individual LRA's before making its loan in 1982. The only 
uncontested facts were that VBF had the sample LRA and list 
of LRA holders before the 1982 loan1. The application of 
1
 The list of LRA holders contained the developer's warranty 
that all those listed had LRA's in the form of the sample LRA. 
(VBF brief, Exhibit E, H 2(d)). 
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summary judgment to individual plaintiffs was premised on 
those uncontested facts, not any "variations" which might 
appear in their LRA's. 
Whether the focus is on the sample LRA or 
Warburton's LRA, the ultimate issue remains the same: Does 
a document conveying a "membership in a club" grant an 
interest in real property as a matter of Utah law? 
II. WARBURTON HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE 
LRA MEETS THE TEST OF WASATCH MINES. 
In Rocky Mountain Energy v. Tax Commission, 
852 P.2d 284 (Utah 1993), this Court reiterated the standard 
set out in Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 
(Utah 1970), for determining whether a document could be 
construed as a conveyance of an interest in land (in the 
absence of a deed). In arguing that his LRA conveyed an 
easement (Section I of Warburton Brief), Warburton does not 
address the Wasatch Mine standard. Indeed, Warburton cites 
one Utah precedent, Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
Dist., 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968). 
Maw did not present the issue of whether a 
document conveyed an interest in real property. The issue 
was whether a right which had admittedly been created was 
inheritable. Maw is tenuous authority for Warburton's 
position that his LRA conveyed an interest in real property. 
In Maw, Annie Maw granted a right of way over her 
4 
property to a neighboring duck club. In exchange, the 
agreement provided that Maw's named sons were entitled to 
free shooting privileges at the duck club. The agreement 
further provided that the shooting privileges of the named 
sons could be transferred to a designated grandson for a 
given year. After the Maw property changed hands, shooting 
privileges were denied. The plaintiffs in Maw were Annie 
Maw's grandsons, who claimed to have succeeded to their 
fathers' shooting privileges. The trial court held that the 
agreement created shooting privileges for the named sons, 
and no others. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the agreement granted rights which were 
personal to designated individuals, and not inheritable. In 
the course of that holding, the Court characterized the 
right created as "in the nature" of an easement in gross. 
However, a fair reading of Maw shows that the issue was not 
whether a document created a real property interest. The 
issue was whether an interest admittedly created was 
inheritable. 
Similarly, High v. Davis, 584 P.2d 725 (Ore. 
1978), did not squarely present the issue of whether an 
agreement conveyed an interest in real property. While the 
High Court held that a form agreement created an interest 
which could be classified as a profit a prendre, it is 
5 
unclear whether the parties even contested that issue. The 
holding turned on a narrower issue: 
The parties both recognize that the 
central issue in these cases is the 
adequacy of the property description in 
the membership agreements to satisfy the 
statute of frauds . . . 
id. at 730. 
Warburton's reliance on Maw and cases from other 
jurisdictions does not address the argument made by VBF: 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a standard for 
determining whether a document conveys an interest in land, 
and the LRA does not measure up. The LRA did not identify 
boundaries to any real property interest.2 Similarly, the 
LRA fails to define the nature or scope of a real property 
interest, instead referring generally to a "club 
membership." The LRA fails the test of Wasatch Mines. 
III. WARBURTON'S CLAIM TO AN EQUITABLE EASEMENT IS 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, AND IS 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
In the five years between the filing of this 
action and the entry of judgment, none of the 180 plaintiffs 
claimed an "equitable easement". To the contrary, the 
plaintiffs claimed their easements arose from written 
agreements. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed their 
2
 The LRA could not identify any boundaries because the 
golf course was "to be constructed" (f 1 of the LRA) and no golf 
course plat had been recorded. (R. 631, U 16). 
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easements in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course "were . . . 
created and granted by a written document . . . a Lot 
Reservation Agreement." (R. 416, H 6). Because this theory 
is raised for the first time on appeal, it should be 
disregarded. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
In any event, Warburton's theory of equitable 
easement is based on Wells v. Marcus, 480 P.2d 129 (Utah 
1971). In Wells, this Court recognized that part 
performance could take "a verbal agreement for an easement" 
out of the statute of frauds. The record is devoid of any 
finding of a verbal agreement. As in Wells, the absence of 
a verbal agreement renders this theory inapplicable. 
IV. WARBURTON HAS MISCHARACTERIZED VBF'S 
POSITION ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
VBF argued that the District Court erred in 
considering extrinsic evidence, because the LRA was facially 
inadequate under Wasatch Mines and the Restatement of 
Property, §450 (VBF Brief, p. 16, et seq.). Warburton 
claims that argument "contradicts the position" previously 
taken by VBF (Warburton Brief, p. 18). That claim is both 
unfair and unfounded in the record. 
To support his claim that VBF contradicted itself, 
Warburton selectively cites from VBF's 1991 Memorandum in 
Support of VBF's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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Warburton cites a string of questions listed by VBF in its 
Memorandum (e.g., Can the course be modified? Can it be 
closed?). Even a casual reading of VBF's Memorandum reveals 
that these questions were raised in VBF's argument that the 
LRA was too indefinite to be construed as a conveyance of 
land. The passage appears in a memorandum section entitled 
"The Claimed Easement Is Too Indefinite", arguing that a 
document cannot convey an interest in land unless it 
sufficiently defines the nature and scope of that interest. 
The listed questions are examples of the indefinite nature 
of the LRA which render it unenforceable as a real property 
conveyance. 
Similarly, in its brief on appeal, VBF argued that 
Wasatch Mines and the Restatement of Property, §450, require 
an adequate definition of the nature and scope of an 
interest in land. Without that definition, the document is 
facially inadequate to convey an interest in land. (VBF 
Brief p. 13, et seq). 
The LRA raises a host of unanswered questions 
regarding the nature and scope of the interest granted. VBF 
has consistently argued that those uncertainties render the 
LRA too indefinite on its face to convey a real property 
interest. VBF has never argued that such unanswered 
questions open the door to extrinsic evidence. 
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V. THE RECORD BELOW DID NOT ESTABLISH 
NOTICE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Warburton's argument on the notice issue is 
two-fold. First, Warburton argues that VBF had notice 
because VBF's "agent" Richard Woodbury was allegedly in 
possession of the individual LRA's. As addressed earlier, 
the record established no agency relation between Richards 
Woodbury and VBF. What the record does reflect is that 
Richards Woodbury acted as a mortgage broker between parties 
to a loan. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. 3405). Second, 
Warburton argues that even if notice to VBF's supposed 
"agent" is insufficient, VBF itself is deemed to have notice 
as a matter of law. Again, Warburton's argument fails 
because the record shows genuine issues of fact regarding 
notice. 
Warburton concurs with VBF's recitation of the 
notice standard. Constructive or inquiry notice will be 
imputed if a party dealing with the land had sufficient 
information to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry 
respecting a conflicting interest, and that inquiry, if 
pursued, would lead to discovery of the truth. See 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), Salt Lake v. 
Garfield & Western Railway Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955). 
The first part of this test creates factual issues on this 
record. There is a fact issue as to whether a prudent man 
9 
would have been on inquiry solely by possession of the 
sample LRA and LRA list. Again, these are the only two 
uncontested facts on notice, interpreting the facts in a 
light most favorable to VBF. D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
VBF presented below the Affidavit of an 
experienced title and real estate professional who stated 
that nothing in the LRA's would have caused him to make 
further inquiry. This Affidavit created a fact issue as to 
whether VBF had sufficient information to be on inquiry. 
The authority cited at length by Warburton, Salt 
Lake v. Garfield, supra, does not help Warburton circumvent 
this factual issue regarding notice. In Salt Lake v. 
Garfield, the undisputed facts were that the defendant 
acquired land on which the neighboring railroad had openly 
erected polls, guywires and trolley wires. Moreover, a deed 
in the defendant's chain of title reserved a right-of-way 
for the railroad. On these undisputed facts, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the defendant had constructive or 
inquiry notice as a matter of law. While that is the 
holding defendant Warburton seeks, the facts are dissimilar. 
Here, there was neither open, notorious possession nor a 
recorded interest by the claimant. There was only an 
unrecorded document referencing a "membership in a club." 
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That document would not have put a title professional on 
inquiry. 
The record below showed a genuine factual dispute 
over whether VBF had sufficient information to be on inquiry 
notice. Partial Summary Judgment was inappropriate on the 
notice issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Partial Summary Judgment should be reversed 
because the LRA did not create an easement as a matter of 
law. Alternatively, fact issues regarding notice preclude 
summary judgment for Warburton. 
DATED this \5* day of July, 1994. 
Attorneys (for Defendants/Appellants 
Virginia Be^ch JTederal Savings and 
Loan and Jeremy Service Corporation 
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Tab A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX GREENHALGH, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
VIRGINIA BEACH FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, a foreign 
corporation; ATLANTIC PERMANENT 
FEDERAL, a foreign corporation; 
JEFFERSON SAVINGS & LOAN, a 
foreign corporation; THE JEREMY, 
LTD, a Utah limited partnership; 
JEREMY SERVICE CORPORATION, a 
Utah Corporation; ASSOCIATED 
TITLE COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporarion, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 10005 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
New before the Court is plaintiffs' Objection to the 
Proposed Order Regarding the Scope of Partial .Summary Judgment, 
and plaintiffs' Motion for Application of 8-22-29 Order of 
Partial Summary Judgment to Specific Plaintiffs. The Court has 
reviewed the memos and other documents filed in connection with 
these matters, has heard oral argument thereon and now rules as 
follows: 
A- ' • 
GREENHALGH V. VIRGINIA BEACH PAGE 2 ORDER 
The Court's ruling in August of 1991 granting partial 
summary judgment was based on a sample LRA submitted to the 
Court with the argument that the language in the sample LRA 
constituted an easement. The Court reviewed that language, 
agreed that it did establish an easement and so ruled. The 
Court did not at that time apply it's ruling to any specific 
plaintiffs. Since that time defendants have raised what they 
argue to be numerous issues of fact as to specific plaintiffs. 
The Court has reviewed each of the claimed issues of fact 
together with the response thereto by plaintiffs. The Court is 
of the opinion that there are three (3) issues of fact which are 
common to all of the plaintiffs and which therefore require a 
trial and the presentation of evidence to the trier of fact 
before the Court can apply it's ruling granting partial summary 
judgment to any specific plaintiffs. Those questions of fact 
are whether consideration has been paid by the plaintiffs, 
whether any of the agreements have been resold by any of the 
plaintiffs and whether any of the plaintiffs have received any 
refunds for their LRA's. 
There are other issues that apply to specific plaintiffs and 
while this Minute Entry does not attempt an exhaustive list of 
all of those issues it will simply point out that there appears 
to be issues that have not been resolved by the Court with 
regard to those LRAs which do not contain language essentially 
GREENHALGH V. VIRGINIA BEACH PAGE 3 ORDER 
identical to the sample LRA used as a basis for the Court's 
ruling. For example, those whose LRA's are "non transferable" 
must be examined in as much as the Court has not, ruled on 
whether or not an easment exists if the membership is not 
transferable. The fact that the memberships were transferable, 
it will be remembered, was one of the factors that the Court 
looked at in it's previousl ruling and, as stated, the Court: has 
not considered whether an easment exists if the membership is 
not transferable. 
There are three agreements, namely those signed by plaintiffs 
numbered 4, 86 and 88 that are substantially different from the 
sample LRA, and the Court has not ruled whether said agreements 
do constitute an easement. 
The Court notes that this is a rather old case, that the 
parties have had a substantial amount of time within which to 
conduct discovery, and the Court is aware that the parties are 
anxious to get this matter resolved. The Court instructs the 
parties to contact the clerk of the court in Summit County to 
obtain a date for a scheduling conference at which time the 
Court can consider the scope of discovery, a discovery cutoff 
date, a date for the trial of this matter and other related 
matters. 
GREENHALGH V. VIRGINIA BEACH PAGE 4 ORDER 
This will serve as the order of the Court. 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
